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RATES OF TIME PREFERENCE AND CONSUMER
VALUATIONS OF AUTOMOBILE SAFETY AND
FUEL EFFICIENCY*
MARK K. DREYFUS and W. KIP VISCUSI
National Economic Research Associates and Duke University
ABSTRACT
This article estimates hedonic price models for automobiles using a data set
on almost 3,000 households from the U.S. Department of Energy Residential
Transportation Energy Consumption Survey. The standard hedonic models are
generalized to recognize the role of discounting of fuel efficiency and safety,
yielding an estimated rate of time preference ranging from 11 to 17 percent. This
range includes the prevailing rate of interest for car loans in 1988 and is conse-
quently consistent with market rates. Purchasers exhibit an implicit value of life
ranging from $2.6 to $3.7 million, which is within the range found in the labor
market as well as other market contexts. The model also estimates a significant
price effect for auto injury risks and fuel efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
AUTOMOBILES are among the most regulated consumer products. Two
of the chief forms of regulation affecting cars are safety and fuel economy
regulations. In the case of safety, the regulatory structure consists of
government-mandated design standards for various safety features rang-
ing from seat belts to air bags. Government interventions affecting fuel
economy are more diverse, as they include fuel economy standards for
corporate fleets (CAFE standards), a gas guzzler tax for low-mileage cars,
and gasoline taxes intended to promote energy conservation.
If market forces were fully effective, these interventions would not be
necessary to correct for inadequacies in consumer decisions. There
would, of course, be a need to address broader societal externalities.
Advocates of government intervention note the presence of externalities
and also frequently assume that automobile owners may not appropri-
ately value the safety features and fuel economy of their cars. The nature
* This research was supported in large part by the Environmental Protection Agency
Cooperative Agreement with Duke University CR-817478-02, which was directed by Dr.
Alan Carlin. Tonja Lindsey of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration compiled
automotive fatality data. Patricia Born provided computer assistance, and an anonymous
referee provided helpful comments.
[Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XXXVIII (April 1995)]
© 1995 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/95/3801-0004$01.50
HeinOnline  -- 38 J.L. & Econ. 79 1995
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
of individual choices in the market affects not only the rationale for gov-
ernment intervention but also the degree to which market-based interven-
tions, such as various tax mechanisms, can be used to promote safety
and fuel economy. For example, do gasoline excise taxes simply lower
the welfare of automobile purchasers, or do they also promote the pur-
chase of more fuel-efficient cars and reduce the total number of miles
traveled?
In the case of business vehicles, such as company-owned cars, the
effect of regulations such as the CAFE standards should .reflect sound
economic decisions. Companies presumably do not face the same degree
of capital constraints that might influence consumer behavior. Moreover,
businesses should be relatively sophisticated vehicle purchasers and will
weight the long-term fuel efficiency and safety characteristics of vehicles
appropriately.
This article examines the valuations of safety and fuel economy by a
possibly less sophisticated purchasing group, private automobile owners.
First, what is the implicit value of life and the injury-price trade-off that
consumers exhibit in the market? Do these values indicate a trade-off
rate similar to that found in other market contexts? The marginal trade-
offs may differ, in part because of government-mandated safety equip-
ment, which consumers may not value as highly as safety attributes pur-
chased voluntarily. In addition, trade-offs will vary depending on the
preferences of the affected group. Automobile purchasers and workers
need not have the same risk-money trade-off.
Second, to what extent do individuals value the differences in fuel
economy across cars? Do they internalize the incentives created by
higher financial costs, such as gasoline taxes and the gas guzzler tax, or
must the government utilize command-and-control regulations, such as
CAFE standards?
Third, what is the implicit interest rate that individuals exhibit when
valuing the long-run safety and fuel economy attributes of their automo-
biles? Do they weight these long-run effects in a manner that is consistent
with their discounting behavior in financial contexts, or do they exhibit
temporal myopia? The nature of this temporal weighting is of conse-
quence, not only in diagnosing the extent to which there is market failure,
but also in indicating whether policy interventions that affect the initial
vehicle price, such as a gas guzzler tax, will have a greater effect on
automobile choice than higher gasoline taxes that create a financial op-
erating cost over time.
Thus, in each of these areas of inquiry, our concern will be twofold.
First, what is the nature of the market trade-offs and is there any clear-cut
evidence of market failure? Second, to what extent can we rely on mar-
HeinOnline  -- 38 J.L. & Econ. 80 1995
CONSUMER VALUATIONS OF AUTO SAFETY
ket-based policy interventions to promote government objectives with
respect to automobile use?
This research utilizes the general econometric approach developed in
the hedonic price literature. For over a half century, there has been con-
cern with obtaining quality-adjusted prices of automobiles, as exhibited
in the work of A. T. Court,' Jack E. Triplett,2 Zvi Griliches,3 Makoto
Ohta and Griliches,4 and Keith Cowling and John S. Cubbin.5 The most
recent literature in this vein has exhibited a concern for fuel economy,
as in the studies by Allen C. Goodman,6 Thomas F. Hogarty,7 Scott E.
Atkinson and Robert Halvorsen,8 and Ohta and Griliches, 9 although the
estimated fuel economy signs are opposite of the predicted direction in
many instances. In addition, one study, that of Atkinson and Halvorsen,"0
examined the price-vehicle safety trade-off but not the fuel economy-
price relationship.
Although the implicit price literature for automobiles is well estab-
lished, this article offers several advances over previous studies. This
will be the first study to provide estimates of the implicit rates of interest
used by individuals in assessing the long-run effects of automobiles, both
with respect to safety and fuel economy. Automobiles are a consumption
good that is durable in nature. Although used cars can be sold or possibly
even rented, in each case the long-term attributes of the car, such as its
1 A. T. Court, Hedonic Price Indexes with Automotive Examples, in The Dynamics of
Automobile Demand (1939).
2 Jack E. Triplett, Automobiles and Hedonic Quality Measurement, 77 J. Pol. Econ. 408
(1969); and Jack E. Triplett, The Economic Interpretation of Hedonic Methods, 66 Surv.
Current Bus. 36 (1986).
3 3. Zvi Griliches, Hedonic Price Indexes for Automobiles: An Econometric Analysis of
Quality Change, in Technology, Education and Productivity (1988); Price Indexes and Qual-
ity Change (Zvi Griliches ed. 1971).
4 Makoto Ohta & Zvi Griliches, Automobile Prices Revisited: Extensions of the Hedonic
Hypothesis, in Household Production and Consumption (Nestor E. Terleckyj ed. 1976).
5 Keith Cowling & John S. Cubbin, Hedonic Price Indexes for United Kingdom Cars,
82 Econ. J. 963 (1972).
6 Allen C. Goodman, Willingness to Pay for Car Efficiency: A Hedonic Price Approach,
17 J. Transport. Econ. & Pol'y 247 (1983).
7 Thomas F. Hogarty, Price-Quality Relations for Automobiles: A New Approach, 7
Applied Econ. 41 (1975).
8 Scott E. Atkinson & Robert Halvorsen, A New Hedonic Technique for Estimating
Attribute Demand: An Application to the Demand for Automobile Fuel Efficiency, 66 Rev.
Econ. & Stat. 417 (1984).
9 Makoto Ohta & Zvi Griliches, Automobile Prices and Quality: Did the Gasoline Price
Increases Change Consumer Tastes in the U.S.? 4 J. Bus. & Econ. Stat. 187 (1986).
10 Scott E. Atkinson & Robert Halvorsen, The Valuation of Risks to Life: Evidence from
the Market for Automobiles, 72 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 133 (1990).
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expected longevity, will influence its value. Since an automobile is a
capital asset, an important question to ask is, what is the extent to which
the implicit rates of time preference for key attributes of the product are
consistent with prevailing market rates of interest?
The second innovation of this article is that, instead of relying on aver-
age published prices for lines of cars, as in previous studies, we utilize
individual household automobile holdings data. With this information, it
will be possible to match cars with the household characteristics of those
who own them. We have further refined our econometric analysis by
including estimates of the fuel economy-price trade-off as well as the
value of the life-price trade-off. Moreover, the value-of-life estimates will
be generated by a price equation that also includes a variable categorizing
the nonfatal injury risks associated with automobiles, so that the value-of-
life estimates will not be capturing the omitted influence of nonfatal risk
attributes of cars.
Section II of the article introduces the hedonic model, which extends
the existing frameworks in the literature by incorporating the various
discounting considerations. After discussing the sample characteristics
and the variables in Section III, Section IV reports on the price equation
estimates, including the role of discounting. The estimated real rate of
interest is between II and 17 percent. As indicated in the conclusion in
Section V, these estimates are consistent with prevailing interest rates
for automobile purchases. The value-of-life estimates are on the order of
$2.6-$3.7 million in 1988 prices.
II. THE HEDONIC MODEL
A. The Hedonic Framework
The basic elements of the econometric approach are based on Sherwin
Rosen's paper on hedonic pricing,1' which we will extend to consider
intertemporal dimensions of automobile holdings. Automobiles embody
a bundle of characteristics, designated below by Ak, where
auto = (A,,A2 ,A 3, ..... A). (1)
In a competitive equilibrium, the price of the good is a function of the
implicit prices of the bundle of its attributes:
Pa.to = P(A1, A 2, A 3, .-. . ,A,). (2)
i Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure
Competition, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 34 (1974).
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This relationship, P(auto), defines the hedonic price function, the equilib-
rium locus of vehicle prices resulting from the market interactions of
producers and consumers for different bundles of vehicle characteris-
tics.
Each implicit marginal price, p(Ak), is the partial derivative of the
equilibrium hedonic price locus with respect to the attribute of interest,
Ak, or
0 P(auto) _
P(Ak) = A-"auk = PA(AlA2 ,A 3 ... An). (3)
This value simultaneously reflects consumers' marginal willingness to pay
for an additional unit of that attribute and the firm's marginal cost of
providing another unit of the attribute.
We use data drawn from household vehicle holdings to estimate vehicle
price as a function of a set of individual automobile i's attributes, Aik,
and owner characteristics, Xz, that is linked to automobile accident rates
(for the zth characteristic of the owner of vehicle i). The reduced-form
estimation equation is
P(auto)i PkAik + I + e,, (4)
k z
where the price of auto i is a function of vehicle and owner attributes
and other unmeasured attributes represented by a random error term ej.
B. Discounting and Hedonic Prices
Because of the durable nature of automobiles, the specification of the
price equation ideally should be extended to account for the long-run
nature of this consumer product. In particular, consumer discount rates
enter as an important variable of concern in valuing the long-run cost
and safety of the product.
The recent literature has included a variety of attempts to ascertain
the implicit rates of time preference associated with consumer decisions,
although none of the product market studies has used a hedonic price
approach. In his examination of household purchases of home room air
conditioners, using a simultaneous model of air conditioner purchase and
utilization rate for 46 households, Jerry A. Hausman found that future
energy expenditures were discounted at a mean rate of 26.4 percent, with
a range of 5.1-89 percent, depending on the household's income level.
12
12 Jerry A. Hausman, Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of
Energy-Using Durables, 10 Bell J. Econ. 33 (1979).
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Dermot Gately employed a similar model to analyze consumer choices
of household refrigerators, for which he found that discount rates could
be as high as 300 percent, with the lowest calculated discount rate equal-
ing 45 percent. 3 Jeffrey A. Dubin examined explicit rates of discount
affecting the type of heating for households, where he found discount
rates at a similar range, such as 44 percent for fuel expenditures associ-
ated with water heaters.14 Finally, Douglas A. Houston examined hypo-
thetical energy choices in a contingent-valuation study, for which he as-
certained a discount rate of 22.5 percent, although once again there was
a considerable range of values. 5
The approach adopted here will be somewhat different in that we will
derive the implicit rates of discount from a hedonic price equation. In
that respect, this analysis most closely parallels the labor market hedonic
wage studies by Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi 16 and Viscusi and
Moore. 7 In particular, they examined how the discounted expected life
years lost due to job risks affected wage rates. However, their approach
dealt with a continuous job activity, not a capital good, so the structure
of the models differs. Our approach will analyze how consumers' dis-
count rates for operating costs and remaining life years of the vehicle
owner affect the automobile price. Thus, the task is to structure the
fuel-efficiency and the risk components of equation (4) to incorporate
these intertemporal aspects of the automobile purchase decision.
Using data on the age distribution of the vehicle fleet, we determined
each vehicle's expected remaining useful life, Ti. The present discounted
value of operating costs (PDVOC) is the discounted sum of operating
13 Dermot Gately, Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-
Using Durables: Comment, 11 Bell J. Econ. 373 (1980).
14 Jeffrey A. Dubin, Will Mandatory Conservation Promote Energy Efficiency in the
Selection of Household Appliance Stocks? 7 Energy J. 99 (1986). Some authors have not
estimated discount rates explicitly but instead have determined the payback period for
appliance types and the discount rates implicit in the estimated payback period. Henry
Ruderman, Mark D. Levine, & James E. McMahon, The Behavior of the Market for Energy
Efficiency in Residential Appliances Including Heating and Cooling Equipment, 8 En-
ergy J. 101 (1987), found discount rates ranging from 20 percent for room and central air
conditioners to as high as 800 percent for electric water heaters.
15 Douglas A. Houston, Implicit Discount Rates and the Purchase of Untried, Energy-
Saving Durable Goods, 10 J. Consumer Res. 236 (1983).
16 Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, 26 Econ.
Inquiry 369 (1988); Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Environmental Health
Risks: New Evidence and Policy Implications, 18 J. Envtl. Econ. S51 (1990); Michael J.
Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Models for Estimating Discount Rates for Long-Term Health
Risks Using Labor Market Data, 3 J. Risk & Uncertainty 381 (1990).
17 W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rates of Time Preference and Valuations of the
Duration of Life, 38 J. Pub. Econ. 297 (1989).
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costs in each year of the vehicle's remaining life,
PDVOCi = (1 + e + e - 2r + + e- ri-I)r)OPERATINGCOSTi, (5)
which can be solved to yield
1 -e - rr
PDVOCi = - OPERATING COSTi, (6)
r
where r is the implicit discount rate. The implicit discount rate of any
individual will reflect the individual's rate of time preference and any
premia for liquidity, risk, and uncertainty. The econometric analysis will
estimate the average value of r for the sample, not for each individual.
A variable pertaining to the discounted operating cost per unit weight
will also be included to capture the importance of operating cost charac-
teristics in relation to the size of the vehicle. The relationship between
fuel economy and weight is a result of the fundamental principle that
additional mechanical energy is required to overcome additional inertia
or weight. Holding all other design and performance factors equal, a
heavier car will be less fuel efficient. But if weight could be held constant,
other design factors would explain variations in fuel economy. To capture
this connection, operating costs are included in the model as a stand-
alone variable to reflect variability in fuel economy related to vehicle
weight and other factors. Operating costs also enter through operating
cost per unit weight, which should reflect the influence of variability in
fuel economy across cars, adjusting for variations in weight.
Similarly, individual j's discounted remaining life years are calculated
as
1 - e - L r
discounted remaining life years - r (7)
where Lj is the expected remaining life of the jth individual and r is the
discount rate over additional life years. Although the discount rate on
operating costs and the discount rate over remaining life years theoreti-
cally may differ, these values could not be distinguished empirically. The
discounted expected life years lost from accidents involving one's specific
automobile holdings is calculated based on the discounted expected life
years lost from fatality risks in each year the car is owned, multiplied by
the discounted number of years the car is owned, 8 or
IS This formulation is an approximation, as it abstracts from the change in the value of
life expectancy over the course of the vehicle life. This approach was more feasible to
estimate than even more complex nonlinear functions.
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discounted expected life years losto =
[ ] X [I - x pr[mortality]li. (8)
discounted life discounted life annual mortality
of vehicle x of owner at risk X risk
This expression captures the expected discounted years of life that the
individual will lose during the discounted expected life of the vehicle.
The potential life of the vehicle, T,, will be less than the individual's life,
Lj, but it is assumed that the consumer uses the same rate of time prefer-
ence r in each of the two component discounting terms. The discounted
expected life years lost term in equation (8) extends the Moore and Vis-
cusi measure of quantity-adjusted life years'9 to situations involving capi-
tal goods in which the exposure to the risk and the individual life have a
temporal aspect that must be taken into account.
Injury rates for autos also affect their long-term attractiveness and
enter the model in discounted form. As in the case of vehicle operating
costs, the relevant time frame for discounting the injury rating is over
the life of the vehicle, not the life of the individual. An injury is by
definition nonfatal, and the probability of an injury changes as an individ-
ual changes the vehicle driven. The injury risk term and the operating
cost terms are defined analogously, where the difference in the annual
injury rating for vehicle i replaces the operating cost for vehicle i in
equation (6). The discounted expected operating costs and injury rating
over the remaining vehicle life and the expected life years lost are substi-
tuted into the hedonic formulation for the operating cost and safety attri-
butes.
The dependent variable in the model will be the natural logarithm of the
price, and to permit flexibility in the functional form for the independent
variables, we use a Box-Cox transformation with a coefficient X to be
estimated.2" Given the recognition of life-cycle concerns in the operating
cost and safety variables, including the 'discounted expected life years
lost term from equation (8), the equilibrium hedonic price locus can now
be specified as
19 Moore & Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, supra note 16.
20 Preliminary empirical analysis varying the functional form of the dependent variable
suggested that the logarithm of price was a more pertinent formulation than the linear form.
The logarithmic formulation is also standard in most labor market hedonic wage studies as
well.
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lfl[P(auto)i]= P + P [ -rLJ 1 - rri MORTALITY RISKir r
" - INJURY/
r
+ OPERATING COST] (9)
r
+ 1 re-Ti OPERATING COST,]rWIH
+ 3 kAki + : BXZ + ej,
k z
where X is the Box-Cox transformation coefficient, which is interpreted
as follows:
A ki - I
i x for X 0 0. (10)
If the transformation coefficient equals one, the model is linear, but as X
approaches zero, the right-hand side takes a logarithmic form:
lim At = In Ak i.
X-0o
III. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND VARIABLES
The data used to obtain the empirical estimates differ from those used
in earlier studies in the literature in that these data reflect actual consumer
automobile holdings. In particular, we utilize the 1988 Residential Trans-
portation Energy Consumption Survey (RTECS) conducted by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE).2' In 1988, DOE collected transportation-
related energy data from a cross section of 2,986 sampled households.
The survey included questions on vehicle holdings, usage, selected vehi-
cle characteristics, and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents.
Additional vehicle attribute data have been collected from industry
21 For a description of the survey, see U.S. Department of Energy, Household Vehicles
Energy Consumption 1988 (1990).
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TABLE 1
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND ANTICIPATED SIGNS OF SELECTED VARIABLES WITH
RESPECT TO PRICE
Standard Anticipated
Variable Mean* Deviation Sign
PRICE 6,622.81 4,109.10 N.A.
MORTALITY RATE (x 1,000) .1962 .0957
INJURY RATING 100.93 23.61
OPERATING COST 563.65 144.08
POWER .04 .01 +
CARGO CAPACITY 15.18 5.57 +
WEIGHT 2,724.65 568.20
MAINTENANCE RATING .91 .28 +
LUXURY-SPORT .18 .39 +
AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION .76 .43 +
TWO-SEAT .02 .14 ?
WAGON .03 .16 ?
CONVERTIBLE .01 .06 ?
DIESEL .01 .10 ?
RESALE VALUE RETAINEDt 57.59 16.77 +
NOTE.-N.A. = not applicable.
* Means weighted by Residential Transportation Energy Consumption Survey population sampling
statistics.
t Excluding 1988 model year new cars.
sources to supplement the RTECS data. The variables used are summa-




PRICE = Vehicle price as of end-of-year
1988. New price for model year
1988 vehicles, used car market
prices for older cars.
RATE = Number of fatalities occurring in
that make/model/year vehicle
divided by number of vehicles on
the road.
ATING = Vehicle injury rating measured
relative to the rating for the
median vehicle. Median rating
equals 100, and lower values are
safer cars.
i COST = Vehicle operating costs measured
in dollars of fuel expenditure per
year. Calculated as gas price
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divided by miles per gallon times
average miles traveled.
COST: WEIGHT = Vehicle operating cost per unit of
vehicle weight.
POWER = The horsepower-to-weight ratio
as a measure of vehicle power/
acceleration.
RGO CAPACITY = Vehicle cargo space in cubic feet.
NANCE RATING = A discrete variable coded as one
if the Consumer Reports
maintenance rating is two or
higher and coded as zero if the
maintenance rating is below
two.
LUXURY-SPORT = A discrete variable coded as one
if the vehicle is classified as a
luxury or sport vehicle.
AUTOMATIC = A discrete variable coded as one
TRANSMISSION if the vehicle has an automatic
transmission.
TWO-SEAT = A discrete variable coded as one
if the vehicle is a two-seat
model.
CONVERTIBLE = A discrete variable coded as one
for convertibles.
WAGON = A discrete variable coded as one
for station wagons.
DIESEL = A discrete variable coded as one
for diesel models.
AMC, FORD, = Discrete variables coded as one
rM, CHRYSLER, for the manufacturer of domestic
MANY, JAPAN, vehicles and for foreign vehicles,
OTHER ORIGIN coded as one for the nation of
origin if that designation is
pertinent and zero otherwise.
YEARXX = Discrete variables coded as one
for the vehicle model year.
SIZEX = Discrete variables coded as one
for the appropriate size category.
Four size categories are
included, from SIZE1, smallest,
to SIZE4, largest.
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RESALE VALUE RETAINED = The percentage of original sales
value retained, as of end-of-year
1988.
Because the data set contains information on the actual holdings of
households, each vehicle represents the actual trade-offs among attri-
butes made by some consumer in the marketplace. A wide selection of
alternative vehicle models is included in this data set because many mod-
els are available equipped with a variety of optional engine types; hence,
a named model may appear repeatedly with different attributes. Most
previous studies included only one observation for a standardized version
of each vehicle model.
Another unique aspect of this study is that the data reflect actual auto-
mobile holdings at a specific point in time-a snapshot of consumer be-
havior. Each vehicle's market price reflects the opportunity cost of own-
ing that specific vehicle. The implicit attribute values derived from a
household's vehicle holdings will provide insight into the trade-offs in
their vehicle stock.
Based on a review of the economics literature related to vehicle choice
and the available marketing information, we selected safety, fuel econ-
omy, power, reliability, and durability as the most important attribute
variables. Other important variables include physical characteristics, ve-
hicle size, manufacturer/nation of origin, and vehicle age. In most prior
studies, a measure of vehicle safety has been an important missing ele-
ment. Only Atkinson and Halvorsen include a measure of vehicle safety,22
but fuel economy is not included in their model, precluding an examina-
tion of the trade-offs between fuel economy and safety. Some studies
incorporated vehicle weight as a proxy for safety, but this attribute affects
other aspects of vehicle performance as well.
Several vehicle attributes are closely related, such as different vehicle
size parameters. Economists have recognized the difficulties posed by
the relationship of vehicle weight to other attributes of interest for over
half a century. 23 Including all possible variables of interest will create
multicollinearity problems, as several authors have reported coefficient
instability. While there are inherent problems of collinearity among motor
vehicle attributes such as fuel economy and size in all such data sets, we
attempted to reduce these problems by carefully choosing our measures
22 Atkinson & Halvorsen, supra note 10.
23 In his 1939 study, supra note 1, at 113, Court recognized that "car weight per se is
undesirable and in a complete analysis would have a negative net regression." This state-
ment presumably means that the weight coefficient should be negative.
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of vehicle characteristics. For example, as a measure of vehicle power/
acceleration, we chose the horsepower-to-weight ratio (as have several
other authors), in part because of the lower collinearity than was created
by measures such as zero-to-sixty acceleration.
Vehicle weight is an important design characteristic because of its
physical contribution to several different aspects of vehicle performance.
Holding all else equal, heavier cars are typically safer and have higher
operating costs per mile traveled.24 Following the lessons of prior studies,
weight is not included as a stand-alone attribute but is entered as an
interaction term where appropriate.
Several other variables which embody elements of vehicle styling are
included, such as dummy variables for luxury and sport vehicles and
vehicle size categories."
A. Vehicle Transactions Prices
Because the hedonic price locus represents equilibrium transactions
prices of different attribute bundles, an empirical analysis should ideally
incorporate actual automobile marketplace transactions prices. Our anal-
ysis focuses on existing vehicle holdings. Average market prices for most
vehicles, based on actual transactions, are widely available. Hence, the
estimated vehicle prices should mirror retail market transactions prices.26
These prices average $6,623 for our sample of vehicles.
2' Triplett, Automobiles, supra note 2, paid particular attention to vehicle weight because
of the correlation between weight and other attributes and because weight served as a proxy
for other variables in his model. In the truncated model, he speculated that weight could
have represented a number of desirable vehicle characteristics, such as the size or capacity
of the vehicle, its durability, or its insulation against sound or vibration.
Griliches, Hedonic Price Indexes, supra note 3, raised another difficulty associated with
these models, especially those including weight as an explanatory variable. He noted that
the correlation coefficients between several of his right-hand-side variables, including
weight, length, and horsepower, fell in the range between 0.73 and 0.92. Such highly corre-
lated explanatory variables led to coefficient instability across several different model speci-
fications.
25 George E. Hoffer & Robert J. Reilly, Automobile Styling as a Shift Variable: An
Investigation by Firm and by Industry, 16 Applied Econ. 291 (1984), found that styling and
styling changes were important factors underlying automobile demand. Another variable
commonly included in similar models but not incorporated here is vehicle handling. The
only available measure of handling, the turning radius, proved to be too highly correlated
with other characteristics to merit inclusion. Other attributes.that have been used in hedonic
automobile studies include slalom time as a measure of vehicle handling, noise and vibration
insulation, leg room, ease of entry and exit, interior space, number of passengers seated
comfortably, braking distance, and a variety of measures of vehicle size.
26 Price data are for year-end 1988 from the Automobile Red Book: Official Used Car
Valuations.
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B. Vehicle Safety Measures
Vehicle safety is incorporated into the model with two separate mea-
sures. The first is the vehicle mortality rate, measured by the ratio of the
number of fatalities occurring in each make/model/year vehicle to the
number of those vehicles on the road. Vehicle mortality rates were calcu-
lated based on information from the U.S. Department of Transportation's
Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) for calendar year 1989.27 For
each make/model/year vehicle, the mortality rate was calculated as fol-
lows:
MORTALITY RATE =
TOTAL FATALITIES FOR 1989 (11)
NUMBER MANUFACTURED x ON-ROAD FACTOR'
where the on-road factor accounts for the difference in the total number
of that make/model/year vehicle manufactured and the estimated number
on the road in calendar year 1989.
The second safety measure is an index of the relative number of per-
sonal injury claims filed for each vehicle model normalized by the total
insurance exposure written by insurance firms for that model. 28 Since
nonfatal accidents are much more frequent than fatal ones, this variable
equals a nonfatal risk measure, or the likelihood of injury resulting from
a given accident in a specific vehicle. The sign on the coefficients of the
two risk variables should be negative since less safe cars (higher value
of the variables in each case) are expected to have a lower price when
holding all other attributes constant.
Vehicle accident rates also depend upon how safely the vehicle is
driven. Measures of mortality risk are consequently a composite of vehi-
cle and driver characteristics.29 An ideal risk measure would relate fatali-
ties strictly to the structural characteristics of each vehicle, exclusive of
driver characteristics. Of course, no such comprehensive measure exists.
To account partially for the joint determination of mortality risk due to
27 Atkinson & Halvorsen, supra note 10, similarly relied on the FARS data for their
fatality measure.
2 These data are published annually by the Highway Loss Data Institute, an affiliate of
the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
29 Vehicle and driver characteristics may not be independent because certain vehicles
are more likely to be owned by those with particular demographic characteristics (for
example, households with children may own safer vehicles) and because, as Peltzman
recognized, driving behavior may respond to vehicle safety characteristics. See Sam Peltz-
man, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 677 (1975).
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both automobile and driver characteristics in the FARS data set, a num-
ber of variables are included in the model which account for non-vehicle-
specific determinants of mortality risk. This approach is similar to that
of Atkinson and Halvorsen, who also used mortality data derived from
the FARS database.3" These variables measure the proportion of fatalities
in each make/model/year vehicle for which the specific characteristic
applies.
The variables used to categorize driver behavior as it affects auto risks
are listed below. They include the proportion of young drivers and that
of older drivers, the proportion of accidents occurring late at night, the
proportion of one-car accidents, the proportion of alcohol-related acci-
dents, the proportion of drivers wearing seat belts, and the proportion of
male drivers. These variables encompass many of the important risk fac-
tors for vehicle accidents and key measures of risk-related behavior, such
as whether drivers wear seat belts.
YOUNG DRIVER = Proportion of fatalities in this make/
model/year vehicle in which the driver
was younger than 25 years.
OLDER DRIVER = Proportion of fatalities in this make/
model/year vehicle in which the driver
was 45 or older.
LATE NIGHT = Proportion of fatalities in this make/
model/year vehicle which occurred
between the hours of midnight and six in
the morning.
ONE-CAR ACCIDENT = Proportion of fatalities in this make/
model/year vehicle in which only one
vehicle was involved.
SEAT BELT = Proportion of fatalities in this make/
model/year vehicle in which the driver
was wearing a seat belt.
ALCOHOL = Proportion of fatalities in this make/
INVOLVEMENT model/year vehicle in which the on-scene
police officer reported alcohol
involvement.
MALE DRIVER = Proportion of fatalities in this make/
model/year vehicle in which the driver
was male.
30 Atkinson & Halvorsen, supra note 10.
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C. Vehicle Operating Cost
The fuel efficiency of each vehicle is measured by annual vehicle op-
erating cost, which is determined by the gallon cost of gasoline divided
by the miles per gallon of fuel times average annual vehicle miles,
OPERATING COST = $ /gmiles
$ (12)
x average miles driven yyear"
The price of gasoline is determined by the household's regional location
and the fuel type reported for that vehicle. Vehicle miles per gallon is
an estimate of actual in-use fuel efficiency.3 Average vehicle miles are
calculated from the subset of RTECS respondents with valid responses
to the mileage survey.3 2 In the empirical analysis, vehicle operating cost
is reformulated as a discounted value over the vehicle life cycle.
If consumers behave rationally in their automobile holdings, the dis-
counted operating cost coefficient should be negative. Indeed, if the mar-
ket efficiently capitalizes life-cycle costs into vehicle prices, the increase
in price should exactly compensate for the discounted value of the fuel
savings over the anticipated vehicle life.
In several previous hedonic studies of automobiles, unanticipated signs
on fuel economy resulted, as reported in Goodman,33 Cowling and Cub-
bin,34 and Hogarty.35 These and subsequent authors3 6 have speculated
that the unexpected sign on fuel economy resulted from multicollinearity
"' This estimate is based on a U.S. Department of Energy adjustment algorithm described
in an appendix available from the authors.
32 Valid mileage estimates were much more likely to be missing from the RTECS data
than for other variables because valid beginning and end-of-year contacts are required to
generate a number. Respondents also must check the odometer reading, which requires
more effort than recalling, for example, the number of seats in the car. Fewer than 65
percent of RTECS respondents supplied valid mileage values. Mileage estimates for the
remaining households were imputed for RTECS reporting using a multiple regression proce-
dure. Comparing the reported mileage values with the imputed mileage values shows that
the imputation consistently underestimated vehicle miles. No differences in demographic
characteristics between the reporting households and the imputed households could be
demonstrated by the authors to account for the differences. The valid mileage results were
used to calculate the average mileage for new 1988 model year vehicles and for pre-1988
vehicles in the household stock.
" Gobdman, supra note 6.
3 Cowling & Cubbin, supra note 5.
35 Hogarty, supra note 7.
36 For example, Atkinson & Halvorsen, supra note 8.
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among automobile attributes used as explanatory variables for vehicle
price.37
D. Vehicle Power/Acceleration
The power of each vehicle is measured by the horsepower-to-weight
ratio. The horsepower-to-weight ratio should most accurately reflect ve-
hicle acceleration because raw horsepower is adjusted for the amount of
weight which must be overcome.
38
E. Vehicle Maintenance/Reliability
A vehicle reliability measure is drawn from Consumer Reports. The
raw data collected for reliability provide an ordinal measure of reliability
rather than a cardinal measure. Therefore, reliability is incorporated in
the regressions as a dummy variable with a value of one for vehicles with
a 5-year average reliability rating of two and above and a value of zero
for a rating of less than two.
F. Cargo Capacity
Vehicle cargo capacity is included as a measure of vehicle size. Con-
sumers may choose between specific vehicles based on the convenience
provided by cargo space.
G. Durability and Vehicle Life
Vehicle durability will be incorporated by a proxy variable measuring
the proportion of the original sale value of the vehicle retained as of the
end of 1988. No true measure of vehicle durability that would.vary from
one vehicle make/model/year to another was available. Though resale
value retained is also an imperfect proxy for durability, it is-presumed
that vehicles with high retained resale values will have a longer life than
vehicles with a lower proportion of original value retained.
The key components that determine the various terms of the model
37 The potentially most troublesome remaining source of multicollinearity in this data set
is that between operating cost and safety as measured by personal injury claims, with a
correlation coefficient of -0.5. The simple correlation between operating cost and weight
equals 0.73, while that between the safety measure and weight is -0.71.
3 Alternative measures of power that have been used in prior studies include zero-to-
sixty acceleration, horsepower, and this ratio. A measure of vehicle acceleration would
have been desirable as acceleration is most readily interpretable by consumers, but compre-
hensive acceleration data were not available. An added advantage associated with this
measure is that the ratio is uncorrelated with other explanatory variables.
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involving discounting pertain to the expected useful life of the vehicle
and the lifetime of the driver. The expected remaining life of the vehicle
is determined from historic data on the age distribution of the vehi-
cle fleet. The expected vehicle life is based on the age at which 50 percent
of the vehicles for a particular model year are expected to be scrapped.
These values are computed from historical reports of the number of vehi-
cles in use in each calendar year for each vehicle model year cohort.39
Based on this trend data, 50 percent of 1987 model year vehicles will
remain in use for 13 years. This measure is intended to represent a con-
sumer's expectation of the vehicle's useful life at the time of purchase.
Although data are not available to differentiate expected vehicle life by
manufacturer or vehicle type, the durability measure based on the re-
tained resale value of each vehicle is included to capture some of the
variability in expected vehicle life within each model year.'
The average automobile owner expects to hold a particular vehicle
about 5 years, but because the vehicle is in turn purchased by a new
owner-at a price approximating the present value of the vehicle, given
its expected operating costs-the expected life of the vehicle, not its
expected length of ownership, is the appropriate discounting time frame.
Similarly, the life expectancy data were derived from life expectancy
tables that recognize the dependence of life expectancy on age, gender,
and race of vehicle owners. The expected remaining life of each vehicle
owner is determined as of the end of 1988.41
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS: DISCOUNTING LONG-TERM RISKS AND
OPERATING COSTS
The estimation of equation (9) utilized 1,775 observations for the model
years 1981-87. Cars older than the 1981 model year are not included
because of limited safety data availability, nor are trucks, vans, and mini-
vans held in household vehicle stocks.
Nonlinear least squares estimates of the model appear in Table 2 for
three separate models, each of which was convergent. Three equations
are estimated. The first equation includes the quantity-adjusted life years,
the discounted injury rating, the two discounted operating cost variables,
39 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, IFVMA Motor Vehicles Facts & Figures
(1992 and other years).
40 This approach ignores any bequested value of the vehicle, which even in the preacci-
dent condition should be several orders of magnitude smaller than the implicit value of life,
a term that is being estimated.
"I U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Vital Statistics of the United States
1988, Vol. 2, Mortality, Pt. A (1991).
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vehicle characteristic variables, and driver characteristic variables. The
second equation omits the discounted injury rating variable since this
variable is correlated with fatality risks and may be capturing to some
extent the influence of the fatality variable.42 Finally, the third equation
omits the set of driver characteristic variables since these measures of
the attributes of drivers in fatal accidents for particular vehicle types may
42 In a survey of the literature on compensating wage differentials for job risks, W. Kip
Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk (1992), found that a
minority of these studies included measures of fatal and nonfatal risks and only a few of
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capture to some extent omitted attributes of the car related to safety.
Ideally, the driver characteristic variables included in equations (1) and
(2) should pertain to the particular vehicle, but since these data are not
available, averages across the vehicle type are included, thus introducing
a possible source of measurement error.
The principal coefficients of interest are consistently significant (95
percent confidence level, one-tailed test). The quantity-adjusted life years
variable is significant in all equations, and the injury variable is significant
in the first equation, the only one in which it is included. Both of the
operating cost variables are statistically significant in all three specifica-
tions.
A. Discount Rate Estimates
The estimates of the discount rate presented in the bottom row of Table
2 are 17 percent (eq. [1]), 11 percent (eq. [2]), and 13 percent (eq. [3]).
The highest discount rate is for the equation including injury and mortal-
ity risks. The 95 percent confidence intervals for the discount rate are
[.13, .22] for equation (1), [.06, .16] for equation (2), and [.06, .19] for
equation (3). Even at the lower bound of the confidence limits, a discount
rate of zero is excluded.
There are a number of interest rate reference points that could be
used to assess the nominal appropriateness of the discount rate. The first
benchmark that one might use is the riskless societal rate of interest. The
prevailing real rate of return in the U.S. economy in the sample year
1988 is typically estimated in the 2-5 percent range. 43 These values are
outside the estimated confidence limits for the discount rate.
Adding the actual 1988 inflation rate of 4.1 percent to the mean esti-
mated real discount rate in Table 2 implies nominal discount rate esti-
mates of 21 percent, 15 percent, and 17 percent. These rates of time
preference are in line with rates found in many other studies of consumer
discounting discussed above and in fact are below most of these estimated
rates, which typically are real rates of time preference.
Moreover, these high nominal rates of interest may not reflect temporal
myopia since the riskless rates of return may not reflect consumer access
to capital markets. Several different financing options are available to car
buyers including commercial banks, savings and loans, credit unions,
43 The lower bound is measured as 90-day Treasury-bill rate minus annual change in
gross national product implicit price deflator (both for 1988). The upper bound is measured
as AAA bond rate minus price deflator. See Council of Economic Advisors, Economic
Report of the President (1993).
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finance companies, and manufacturer-provided financing." Financing
may be more difficult to arrange for used car purchases as the average
nominal interest rate for new car financing in 1988 was 12.6 percent, but
for the used cars considered in our survey it averaged 15.1 percent.45
This value lies within the 95 percent confidence interval for all three
estimates of the discount rate. The estimated discount rates are conse-
quently quite consistent with prevailing rates of interest facing members
of the sample.
B. Value of Life Estimates
Discounted remaining life years are calculated based on the characteris-
tics of the household head as reported in the DOE RTECS survey data.
If the household head is not the purchaser/holder of a vehicle reported
for the household, then an error may be introduced. The statistical value
of life estimated in the life-cycle context is given by
aPRICE =ELYLX
aMORTALITY RATE = X OMORTALITY RATE x PRICE, (13)
where ELYL stands for the discounted expected lost years of life, and
the final multiplication by price is necessary because the model was esti-
mated on the natural log of price.
The estimates of the implicit value of life are $2.6 million for equation
(1), $3.1 million for equation (2), and $3.7 million for equation (3). In
column 2 of Table 2, results are presented for the model excluding the
injury variable. The mean statistical value of life in this case is $3.1
million, 19 percent higher, indicating that excluding a separate measure-
ment for nonfatal injuries causes the fatality valuation to reflect the value
of nonfatal injuries.' By way of comparison, the Atkinson and Halvorsen
estimate of automobile purchasers value of life was $3.6 million (in 1988
dollars) 4 7-an estimate very close to those obtained here.
Because we also estimate the implicit rate of discount for life years
lost, we can also calculate the value per discounted marginal life year.
This amount is $476,000 for equation (1), $367,000 for equation (2), and
I In 1990, 62 percent of new car purchases were financed. Of those financed, 32 percent
were financed through manufacturers. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, supra
note 39.
45 Id. at 52.
4 An analogous result was first demonstrated in the labor market by W. Kip Viscusi,
Employment Hazards: An Investigation of Market Performance (1979).
1 Atkinson & Halvorsen, supra note 10.
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$496,000 for equation (3). These discounted values per life year estimates
are over twice as high as the estimated discounted value per year of life
lost of $170,000 (in 1986 prices) implied by workers' choice of hazardous
jobs by Moore and Viscusi. 41
C. Other Parameter Estimates
The first two regression results in Table 2 include controls for the driver
characteristics in fatal accidents. The mortality risk measure used in the
model does not represent a pure measure of automobile-specific risk be-
cause driver characteristics are not excised from the rates. Therefore,
selected characteristics of drivers in fatal accidents are included in the
model as control variables. These variables measure the proportion of
fatal accidents occurring in each make/model/year vehicle that reflect the
characteristic in question. The first column in Table 2 indicates that the
proportion of drivers who are young, who are older, who are wearing
seat belts, and who have alcohol involvement were all statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.05 level.
Another key market performance test is the extent to which fuel effi-
ciency cost differences are fully capitalized into the price. The dollar
value of consumers' marginal willingness to pay for changes in the annual
cost of driving can be calculated from the transformation coefficients of
the annual operating cost variable and the variable interacting annual
operating cost with vehicle weight. Because PDVOC is a present value,
the effect of PDVOC on price, based on both of the PDVOC terms in
equation (9), is the capitalization rate of operating expenses. The capital-
ization rate refers to the rate at which the marketplace incorporates life-
cycle fuel costs into market prices of vehicles. If markets function per-
fectly, there is full capitalization, that is a one-to-one correspondence
between changes in the discounted value of life-cycle operating costs and
vehicle price, and the capitalization rate is one. If, however, there is no
relationship between life-cycle fuel expenditures and vehicle price, the
capitalization rate would be zero.
The capitalization rate for discounted life-cycle operating costs is esti-
mated at -0.35, implying that a $1 increase in life-cycle operating costs
lowers vehicle price by $0.35. Several factors could account for this re-
48 Moore & Viscusi, Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, supra note 16. Our overall value
of life estimates are, however, more reasonable than those obtained in their labor market
discounting study.
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suit. Consumers may, for example, not believe the time before the vehicle
is scrapped is as great as we have assumed.49
V. CONCLUSION
If automobile markets functioned perfectly, consumers would fully
value the safety and fuel efficiency of their vehicles, and the government
could restrict regulatory intervention to broader societal externalities.
Additional problems arise if consumers are myopic and neglect their fu-
ture selves and the future ramifications of car purchases with respect to
safety and fuel efficiency. This type of market failure also limits the effi-
cacy of regulatory interventions that exploit consumers' responsiveness
to prices. If, for example, consumers ignore the fuel efficiency attributes
of their autos, then higher gasoline taxes that raise the operating costs of
vehicles would not affect their vehicle purchase decisions.
Our findings suggest that these extreme consumer responses are not
evident. The implicit value of life estimates for automobile owners were
in the range of approximately $2.6-$3.7 million, where these estimates
accounted for the injury risk of the autos and were obtained within the
context of a nonlinear model that discounted the expected life years at
risk. This estimated value-of-life range is the same range as previous
estimates in the literature, including previous evidence on the value of
life for automobile purchasers.5 0 These findings provide no basis for con-
cluding that consumers undervalue automobile safety. The safety of auto-
mobiles is highly regulated and mandated through government regula-
49 Both the low capitalization rate and the high discount rate could be the result of the
application of the estimation model. It is assumed in these estimates that a vehicle lasts 13
years and then has no scrap value. This assumption is based on the median time to scrap
for all vehicles on the road. The median time that car buyers expect to keep their new cars
is only 5.5 years. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, supra note 39. After this
period, well over 90 percent of vehicles are still on the road. Upwardly biased rates could
occur if a consumer bases a vehicle ownership decision on a short time frame, but the
discount rate is calculated for a longer time frame. The computed discount rate may appear
higher than the rate underlying the ownership decision.
Two sources of measurement error may have been introduced by data on the expected
lives of vehicles and vehicle owners. The 13-year expected vehicle life ignores variability
among different makes and models. However, other variables, such as manufacturer and
durability, may act as controls for variability across vehicles, minimizing any errors associ-
ated with measurement of expected vehicle life.
50 Viscusi, supra note 42, reviews the literature on the estimates of the value of life and
health. Although most of the estimates in the literature are clustered in the $3 million-$7
million range, estimates in the $2 miltion-$3 million range, such as that yielded in one of
our specifications, are not unprecedented. For example, eight of the labor market studies
he reviews and six of the value of life studies outside of the labor market have estimated
values of life at or below this level.
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tions. If these safety regulations provide more safety than is optimal from
the standpoint of a fully informed consumer, one would expect to observe
a lower estimated marginal value of life for automobiles than for other
areas of choice in which the safety level provided is freely chosen.
The focal point of the analysis was on the role of discounting as it
relates to consumers' valuation of the fuel economy attributes of cars
and the life and health effects of automobiles. The estimated rates of time
preference range from 11 to 17 percent. Although these rates of time
preference exceed the riskless rates of return in the economy, they are
quite consistent with the prevailing rates of interest for automobile pur-
chases. Moreover, these estimated rates are at the low end of the esti-
mated implicit rate of interest found in a variety of other contexts in the
literature. Consumer discounting for automobiles appears to be consis-
tent with prevailing market rates and in a much more reasonable range
than many estimated discount rates for energy efficiency for home appli-
ances and similar choices.
Although these results are not sufficiently precise to imply that there
is pinpoint accuracy in the discounting behavior of consumers, the results
do suggest that there is sufficient consumer orientation toward the present
value of decisions that market interventions can be utilized that affect
the stream of payoffs associated with choices. These interventions need
not be restricted to those with an immediate effect. Consumers do have
a long-term perspective with respect to safety and fuel efficiency, and
government officials can potentially influence the choices consumers
make by affecting the perceived time stream of payoffs along these di-
mensions. Whether there is a legitimate rationale for such intervention
hinges on concerns outside the scope of this paper.
Safety and fuel efficiency are two of the most prominent concerns of
transportation regulation policymakers. These attributes of automobiles
are salient for consumers as well. The principal application of our findings
is that policymakers contemplating intervention in this market context
should be cognizant of the extent to which there are already market forces
in operation. Moreover, if we do choose to intervene, we should attempt
to design the interventions to work in concert with the powerful market
forces that exist in this market rather than to be independent of them.
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